




Australian and New Zealand Journal of European Studies 
http://www.eusanz.org/ANZJES/index.html 
Vol.2(2)/3(1) 
ISSN 1837-2147 (Print) 
ISSN 1836-1803 (On-line) 
 
 
Goal Rationality in the Formulation and Conduct of Soviet 
and Russian Foreign Policy 
 
ROBERT F. MILLER 





T.H. Rigby’s concept of goal rationality, building on Max Weber’s ideas of substantive and formal-
legal rationality in the functioning of bureaucracies, provided important insights into the relevance of 
ideology for understanding how the Soviet system worked at both the domestic and foreign policy 
levels.  This ideological dimension has tended to be neglected in much of the Western literature on 
Soviet communism.  Since the end of the Soviet system, Russian leaders have tended to avoid ideology 
as a negative example to be avoided.  Nevertheless, in their search for doctrines and principles to guide 
foreign and domestic aspects of the pursuit of national interests, these leaders have willy-nilly fallen 
back on ideological ways of thinking, which Rigby’s goal rationality helps to elucidate. 
 






Despite the claims of the Putin-Medvedev ‘tandemocracy’s to have abandoned 
ideology in the formulation and conduct of Russia’s foreign policy and to have 
replaced it with the concept of ‘the national interest,’ that concept itself is obviously 
highly ambiguous and subjective. In this essay I shall attempt to show how in the 
process of elaborating a systematic approach to the shaping of the foreign (and 
domestic) goals, strategies and tactics of the Russian Federation (RF), Russian policy 
makers have, willy-nilly, constructed a new ideology. Because of the personal 
backgrounds of the current rulers and the expectations of a large segment of the elite 
and the Russian public, this new ideology has, over time, come to embody elements of 
the old Soviet ideology of Marxism-Leninism and the ‘building’ of socialism and 
communism. Why this re-emergence has taken place was foreshadowed by T.H. 
Rigby in his various comments on and modifications of Max Weber’s famous analysis 
of the legitimation and rationalisation of various ideal types of governance and 
administration: namely, traditional, charismatic, and legal legitimacy and their 
associated modes of rationality—patrimonial, substantive and formal.1
                                                 
1 See Weber’s discussion of bureaucracy in H.H.Gerth and C. Wright Mills, From Max Weber: Essays 
in Sociology, New York, Galaxy, 1985, pp. 72-83. See also Chapter VIII, pp. 196-244 and Chapter IX on 
‘The Sociology of Charismatic Authority,’ pp. 245-252. 
 That is, 
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traditional, charismatic and law-based forms of state authority and their associated 
ways of obtaining subject, or citizen, compliance.  
 
To these, Rigby has added the concepts of ‘goal legitimation’ and ‘goal rationality’ in 
the context of his conceptualisation of Soviet rule as a ‘mono-organisational’ system.2
 
  
Under such a system, Rigby envisages the various institutions and sub-institutions of 
Soviet rulership—for example, the army, the secret police, the judiciary, the economic 
planning system, the various inspection services, the Comintern and the ministry of 
foreign affairs—as sub-units of the mono-organisational hierarchy, each with its 
concrete task or modus operandi, as part of the overall goal of building socialism and 
the world-wide victory of communism. Public organisations, such as trade-unions, 
sports clubs, youth groups (Pioneers, Komsomol), all  had  their tasks and sub-goals, 
rationalised as furthering the overall goal. 
In time, not only the USSR and its own citizens, but also citizens of the Soviet Bloc 
countries were subject to the same obligations of deference to the goal-setter-in-chief: 
the Soviet leadership under the General Secretary of the CC, CPSU. The so-called 
Third-World countries ‘with a socialist orientation,’ like Ethiopia and Nicaragua, 
were nominally subject to similar, albeit lesser, obligations but were also thus eligible 
for Soviet political and military assistance, as well as subsidised economic aid and 
trade relations. The introduction of the Brezhnev Doctrine in the wake of the Warsaw 
Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, under which each socialist regime was under 
obligation not only to its own working class but also to the higher interests of the 
international socialist community, was a last effort at ideological legitimation of 
Muscovite domination. Polish President Wojciech Jaruzelski pointed to the 
application of this doctrine as justification for his crackdown on the Solidarity 
Movement in December 1981.3 The scope of the mono-organisational architecture 
and its legitimising myth were thus fully extended right up to the penultimate 
moment of Soviet history.4
 
 
Some Historical Illustrations of the Analysis 
 
The victory of the Bolsheviks in the October Revolution and the Civil War represented 
the triumph of substantive rationality and the naked use of organised violence. As 
Rigby and Ferenc Feher have argued, neither Lenin nor Stalin possessed the slightest 
traces of charisma, nor could they claim any of the other types of legitimacy—
traditional or formal-legal. The only genuinely charismatic member of the ruling 
coterie during this period was Leon Trotsky, and his espousal of the doctrine of 
‘Permanent Revolution’—a key illustration of applied goal rationality—found little 
support among the exhausted Bolshevik leaders, who had just adopted, at Lenin’s 
insistence, the New Economic Policy, or NEP. Thus, Stalin’s espousal of the slogan 
‘Socialism in One Country’ won the battle for Bolshevik hearts and minds. In some 
ways, the introduction of NEP signalled a shift to formal rationality, a system of rules 
and regulations to normalize economic expectations and prepare for the eventual 
                                                 
2 These concepts are most comprehensively formulated in T.H. Rigby, The Changing Soviet System: 
Mono-organisational Socialism from its Origins to Gorbachev’s Restructuring, Aldershot,Edward 
Elgar Publishing, 1990. See especially Chapter 7 on ‘Political Legitimacy,’ pp. 155-182.  
3 For General Jaruzelski’s justification for his actions and the nature of Soviet pressures, see Wojciech 
Jaruzelski, ‘Stan Wojenny Dlaczego,’ Polska Oficyna Wydawnycza, “BGW,” 1992. 
4 For an interesting analysis of the nature of Soviet-type societies, with some alternative approaches to 
Rigby’s paradigm, see Ferenc Feher, Agnes Heller and Gyorgy Markus, Dictatorship Over Needs: An 
Analysis of Soviet Societies, Oxford, Basil Blackwood, 1983. See especially chapters 4 and 7. 
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advance of socialist construction on the basis of Marx’s legitimising conception of 
primitive capitalist accumulation. 
 
This resort to formal rationality was, however, merely a thin veneer over what had 
remained an internal struggle for power to dictate the further course of the 
revolution. During the latter 1920s and 1930s, Stalin found it expedient to create a 
mantle of charisma for Lenin and, by association, for himself, to legitimise his plans 
for the further development of socialism. Under the rubric of ‘primitive socialist 
accumulation.’ which he had borrowed from Trotsky’s erstwhile ally Evgenyi 
Preobrazhenskii, Stalin set the stage for forced draught industrialisation on the backs 
of the collectivised peasantry.  
In foreign policy, this pattern was replicated in the gradual reduction of the 
Communist International from the status of the headquarters of the world revolution 
to that of an instrument of Soviet foreign policy under the control of the International 
Department of the AUCP(B) Central Committee. Its tasks, as one of the sub-units of 
the mono-organisational hierarchy, was to foster Soviet interests by using the 
member national communist parties as conduits for pro-Soviet propaganda and 
financial assistance and as facilitators of Soviet intelligence activities. Their functions 
were similar to what we have seen recently in the case of the ten Russian espionage 
‘sleepers’ exchanged by the USA for Russian agents of American intelligence in 
Russian prisons. 
 
That these activities were considered legitimate in terms of the goal of world 
revolution indicated the extent to which they were indeed considered legitimate by 
foreign communist party members. The Great Purges of 1936-38 and the associated 
‘Show Trials’ of former Bolshevik stalwarts did not seem to dent the credibility of 
Stalin’s leadership. However, his legitimacy and reputation for charismatic rectitude 
were put to an extreme loyalty test by the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact of 23 August 
1939, which saw the USSR switch sides in the run up to the anticipated world war, 
without regard to the anti-Bolshevik fulminations of Adolph Hitler and the 
increasingly visible atrocities of the Nazi regime. Many communists refused to believe 
that the goal of world socialism could justify such blatant opportunism. However, the 
subsequent invasion of the USSR by Hitler in June 1941 and the transformation of the 
‘imperialist war’ into the ‘Great Patriotic War’ caused most of them to jump back 
aboard the socialist ship and support the great crusade for victory over the Nazi and 
fascist phase of imperialism. 
 
The victory over the Axis in 1945 considerably reinforced Stalin’s credibility as a 
veritable genius in all fields of human endeavour and strengthened his personal cult 
status. He used this status to impose his will on the greatly expanded post-war 
socialist community of nations. The attempt was made to formalise the institutions of 
Soviet control by regularizing the procedures for nominally collective decision 
making, most notably by establishing the Cominform to replace the Comintern, 
which had formally been abolished to assuage the fears of his Western wartime allies. 
In reality, of course, the Comintern had never been abolished, but its functions had 
rather been transferred to the International Department of the Communist Party 
Central Committee.  
 
This process well illustrates the persistence of substantive rationality over formal-
legal rationality in Soviet practice, based as it was on Stalin’s charismatic legitimacy, 
which was, in turn, justified by the goal rationality of building socialism on a world 
historical scale.  
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The death of Stalin in March 1953 eliminated the charismatic component of the 
legitimacy construct, but it did not materially weaken the policy impact of the 
ideological goal. However, it did for a time undermine the ability of the USSR to 
obtain automatic compliance with its strategic and tactical dictates. This weakening 
was clearly manifest in the legitimacy crisis within the Bloc following Khrushchev’s 
anti-Stalin revelations at the XXth Party Congress in February 1956, most notably in 
the anti-Soviet unrest in Poland and Hungary in October and November. Mao Zedong 
soon recognized the dangers of de-Stalinization and began openly to question 
Khrushchev’s legitimacy as an ideological and political goal- setter for the Bloc. Mao’s 
abandonment of the ‘Hundred Flowers’ effort at liberalization and his introduction of 
the ‘Great Leap Forward’ program in 1958 demonstrated his disagreement with 
Khrushchev’s formulation of socialist construction and his rationalisation that all 
socialist countries would achieve communism at about the same time. 
 
The spillover from this disagreement on ideology to practical inter-state relations was 
shown in Khrushchev’s refusal to fulfil promises to assist Chinese nuclear arms 
development or to provide military backing for China during the Formosa Straits 
crisis in 1958. Khrushchev’s reckless policies toward the Kennedy Administration 
leading to the Cuban Missile Crisis in October 1962 and especially his back down by 
withdrawing the missiles from Cuba further damaged the Sino-Soviet relationship 
and made China an alternative rallying point for dissident leaders within the Bloc, 
such as Enver Hoxha, as well as for Maoist non-ruling communist parties throughout 
the world, including Australia. Thus, the goal of building socialism remained, but the 




The failure of Khrushchev to achieve his stated goals, domestically, by lack of 
progress in ‘overtaking and surpassing the West’ in industrial and agricultural 
production, and in foreign policy, in the paucity of achievements of the ‘peaceful co-
existence’ doctrine—most notably in the U-2 incident of 1960 and the ascription to 
him of personal responsibility for the dangerous deterioration of relations with 
China—led to his unseating by his colleagues, headed by Leonid Brezhnev and Aleksei 
Kosygin in October 1964. This further weakened Soviet legitimacy as head of the Bloc. 
Attempts to curry favour with Mao by examining the ideological disputes that had 
separated them soon proved to be futile. Mao himself was not entirely secure because 
of the disastrous failures of the Great Leap Forward. Meanwhile, efforts to reform the 
Soviet economy by Premier Kosygin had unleashed a call for reform of socialism 
itself. This occurred not only in the Western European ‘Euro-communist’ parties, but 
also even within the Bloc, most assertively in Czechoslovakia, where the ‘Prague 
Spring’ promised a new era of ‘socialism with a human face.’ In August 1968, Warsaw 
Pact tanks put a stop to that ‘deviation’ and saw the reassertion of Soviet domination 
under the rubric of the ‘Brezhnev Doctine,’ mentioned above. 
 
In an effort to re-establish Soviet ideological hegemony and call a halt to further 
speculation on possible alternative paths to communism, Brezhnev and his 
ideologists introduced the concept of ‘really existing socialism.’ That is, unlike the 
Euro-communist, Prague or Maoist versions, there was only one true model of 
                                                 
5 For a good analysis of the course of Sino-Soviet relations and the vagaries of Russian influence see 
Thomas Bernstein’s Introduction to China Learns from the Soviet Union, 1949-Present, (Thomas P. 
Bernstein and Hua-Yu Li, eds.), Lanham, Lexington Books, 2010. Ideological and practical aspects of 
the relationship are elaborated upon by several of the other contributors to this useful compendium. 
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socialism: that existing in the USSR and those socialist countries which replicated the 
model. It was not a very inspiring prospect for emulation, and some countries that 
remained loyal to Moscow, namely, Poland and Hungary and otherwise deviant 
Romania, obviously diverged from the model, but as long as they did not openly 
contest Soviet control of the Bloc and maintained party control they were allowed to 
operate as they saw fit. Domestically, too, the Brezhnev modus operandi allowed 
people a good deal of internal ideological leeway, as long as they did not openly 
challenge the existing system. It was already quite clear that the rationality of the goal 
of socialist and communist construction no longer conveyed much legitimacy. 
 
The last Soviet leader, M.S. Gorbachev, although certainly a believer in socialism as a 
worthy goal per se, completed its dismantling as a source of legitimacy for Soviet rule 
at home and abroad. Faced with growing evidence of the failures of the system in 
competition with the globalising capitalist West, he began to regard the obligations 
associated with dominance of the ‘world of socialism’ as an increasing burden with 
little payoff for the USSR. When he asked for an expert opinion on the meaning of 
‘socialist orientation’ as applied to certain Third-World dependencies of the USSR, he 
was quoted as saying “But that’s crap!”  (‘No eto zhe gavno.’)  His decision to 
withdraw Soviet forces from Afghanistan was one consequence. He increasingly 
advised his country’s Warsaw Pact and COMECON allies facing similar economic and 
social problems to the USSR’s that they would have to deal with them on their own. 
His views eventually evolved to the point where he eschewed the entire edifice of the 
mono-organisational system, including the ‘leading role’ of the Communist Party, 
elevating his new position as President of the USSR to a higher level than his General 
Secretaryship of the CPSU Central Committee.  
 
The speedy victory of the USA and its allies over Sadam Hussein in ‘Desert Storm’ 
and the centrality of the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) showed that militarily, 
too, the Soviet Union could no longer afford to compete with the West and that 
Moscow would in future have to rely more on the carrots of ‘soft power’ than on its 
traditional dependence on the sticks of hard military power. The rest, as they say, is 
history. Within three years, the USSR itself had ceased to exist, and Gorbachev was 
out of a job.  
 
Applying These Categories to the Present Situation 
 
Boris N. Yel’tsin’s presidency began with a conscious effort to abandon ideology, that 
is, its Marxist-Leninist incarnation, in favour of the Francis Fukuyama ‘end-of-
history’ variant of liberal democracy and free-market economics. The tacit belief was 
that by adopting the so-called ‘Washington consensus’ as the model for the 
transformation of the Soviet socialist economy, Yel’tsin and his economic lieutenant, 
Acting Prime Minister Yegor Gaidar, would ensure Western assistance and gain 
admission to the club of major capitalist powers.  
 
One of the first things he did on assuming the Presidency was to break up the KGB 
into domestic and foreign intelligence agencies: the FSB and the SVR, respectively. 
Internally, by personal experience, he recognized that the security organs, as the 
enforcing centrepiece of the mono-organisational system, represented an enduring 
threat to his reformist, Western-oriented leadership. Externally, the dissolution of the 
KGB was intended as a signal that Russia had changed and would henceforth be a 
reliable partner of the West. Indeed, Yel’tsin and his Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev 
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went out of their way to co-operate with the USA and its Western allies in addressing 
conflict situations emerging from the break-up of the communist system, above all in 
divided Germany, Czechoslovakia and disintegrating Yugoslavia. 
 
However, as the Russian economy increasingly fragmented, internal fissures 
appeared in the form of conservative challenges to the pro-Western orientation of the 
government. This was manifested in the refusal of the parliamentary leadership to 
confirm Gaidar as Prime Minister and ultimately in an abortive parliamentary coup 
against Yel’tsin and his reformers in 1993. He became increasingly isolated and 
arbitrary in his relations with colleagues and erstwhile supporters. A crucial moment 
for Western attitudes toward Russia and its interests was the economic meltdown of 
August 1998, when Russia was forced to default on its short-term bonds (GKOs) and 
sharply devalue the ruble.6
 
 
A major turning point came in March 1999, when the USA and NATO, ignoring 
Russian objections, launched a three-month bombing campaign against Serbia in 
support of Kosovar independence. Yeltsin was furious and took a series of largely 
ineffectual military steps to show the depth of Moscow’s displeasure, including 
dispatching an intelligence-gathering ship to the Mediterranean. His decision to send 
Russian troops from its peacekeeping contingent in Bosnia to Pristina airbase almost 
led to open hostilities with NATO forces. If not for the calming actions of British 
General Mike Jackson, in charge of the Western peacekeeping forces in Kosovo, to 
finesse the situation by including the Russian troops under his UN-endorsed 
command, this could have led to direct armed conflict. US General Wesley Clarke’s 
inclination to confront the Russians directly could have led to World War III, in 
Jackson’s opinion expressed at the time.  
 
In reality, the prospect of early incorporation of Romania and Bulgaria into NATO 
had led to their refusal to let Russian planes use their airspace to resupply and 
reinforce the Russian contingent in Kosovo. That made it impossible for Yel’tsin to 
act upon his evident anti-Western impulse. Meanwhile, his Prime Minister Yevgenii 
Primakov, as Foreign Minister from 1996, had begun to re-orient Russian foreign 
policy away from the USA and NATO. He introduced a new strategy of 
multilateralism, seeking allies in the East and South, most notably in China and 
India, against what he perceived as American hegemony.  
 
Primakov’s decision to abandon a fence-mending trip to Washington in March 1999 
in anger at the beginning of the NATO bombing campaign was a powerful statement 
of Russian displeasure and its growing anti-Western orientation. Indeed, Primakov’s 
stance was so popular in Russian policy-relevant and public circles that an 
increasingly paranoid and impulsive Yel’tsin found it expedient to fire him as Prime 
Minister in May 1999. On New Years Eve, on the cusp of the new millennium, 
suffering from ill health, he announced his retirement and the designation as Acting 
President of Vladimir V. Putin. 
 
Yel’tsin’s intention to join the Western club had clearly failed. This was largely a 
result of bad faith on the part of US leaders. Perceiving the economic and foreign 
policy weaknesses of the new Russia, they no longer felt it necessary to take Russian 
interests into serious consideration nor even to fulfil some of the promises made at 
                                                 
6 For an insightful insider’s account of  these measures see Martin Gilman, No Precedent, No Plan: 
Inside Russia’s Default, Cambridge, MA, MIT Press, 2010.  
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the time of the dissolution of the Soviet empire. Moscow’s new conception of Russia’s 
interests and how to pursue them was primarily negative. The goal became to thwart 
US and NATO policies and to try to regain acknowledgement of Russia’s interests and 
primacy in the so-called ‘Near Abroad,’ the former republics and provinces of the 
USSR. In the words of American stand-up comedian Rodney Dangerfield, the 
problem was that Washington and its allies showed ‘no respect’ for Russia. This was 
not yet an ideology, but it was a step in that direction. 
 
In hindsight, the choice of Putin to succeed him as President seems somewhat 
strange, given Yel’tsin’s reformist aspirations and dislike of the rigidities of the Soviet 
mono-oganizational system. However, at the time, Putin’s credentials, despite his 
KGB background, seemed promising and very much in line with Yel’tsin’s aspirations. 
He had been a middle-ranking KGB officer with a relatively liberal reputation, thanks 
largely to his association with Anatoly Sobchak, the reformist mayor of St. Petersburg 
and his former law school lecturer. Sobchak had placed him in a series of increasingly 
important positions, where he had shown himself to be an effective administrator and 
liaison officer in the city’s dealings with foreign businesspeople. Moreover, in the 
wake of the attempted coup of August 1991, largely instigated by the KGB, Putin had 
demonstratively resigned his reserve commission in that organisation. He was called 
to Moscow in 1997 and rapidly rose in Yel’tsin’s presidential staff and was named as 
head of the new FSB. By 16 August 1999, he had risen to the position of Prime 
Minister. He soon distinguished himself by defending Yel’tsin against charges of 
corruption by the Chief RF Prosecutor Yurii Skuratov, thus demonstrating he knew 
how to protect his patron and where the proverbial ‘bodies were buried.’ He had also 
demonstrated his modesty by at first refusing to accept Yel’tsin’s nomination on the 
grounds that he did not feel himself ready for such a position. In short, by the time he 
became President in his own right in March 2000, Putin had demonstrated 
considerable administrative and political capabilities as a leader who knew how to 
make the rules and when and how to break them. 
 
One of Putin’s first acts upon his inauguration as President in May 2000 was to re-
assert central control over the diverse regions of the country by imposing a so-called 
‘power vertical’ and dividing the country  into seven federal districts overseen by his 
personal representatives. During his second term in 2004 he ordered the central 
appointment of regional governors, who were to rule on sufferance of the President, 
subject only to confirmation by the local legislatures. To head up the various agencies 
and government departments, Putin relied on personal contacts and associates from 
his KGB and public service days. The fact that he was simultaneously re-establishing 
governmental control over previously privatised strategic sectors of the Russian 
economy, such as the oil and gas industry, the railroads and the armaments industry 
and putting his cronies in charge, meant a substantial reversal of Yel’tsin’s post-
communist transformation process.  
 
Early in his reign, the Kursk nuclear submarine tragedy in August 2000, where his 
absence from the scene had set off a wave of anger among the families and friends of 
the victims and substantial criticism in the media, along with serious mishandling of 
the event by the authorities nominally in charge, caused him to be much more 
concerned with his personal image and the importance of public relations (PR.)  Even 
before this, he had used the renewed upsurge of rebel activity in Chechnya and 
Ingushetiia to establish a personal image of toughness and resoluteness. The 
resulting PR-focussed image-building and an increasing sensitivity to contrary 
opinions and political opposition led to the emergence of a typical Weberian 
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paternalistic traditional legitimation. It was based on a kind of substantive rationality 
that was usually presented as formal rationality under the guise of Putin’s favourite 
slogan of the ‘dictatorship of laws.’ Sarah Whitmore has recently elaborated on the 
domestic implications of this tension between formal-legal rationality and what she 
calls the ‘neo-patrimonial’ rationality of Putin’s mode of governance.7 Increasing 
public adulation of Putin’s charismatic PR image, reflected in public opinion surveys, 
has demonstrated the popular legitimacy of this system. It became increasingly 
difficult for critics in the media and intellectual circles to oppose him, as Mikhail 
Khodorkovskii, Vladimir Gusinskii and Boris Berezovskii found to their discomfort. 
The fact of the Jewish ethnic background of these three and other so-called 




The ideology legitimising his rule was thus one based on a combination of traditional 
Great-Russian ethnic pre-eminence, confidence in the rationality and wisdom of the 
leader and stable dirigiste government. One of Putin’s most prominent policy aides, 
Vladislav Surkov, calls this ideology ‘sovereign democracy,’ that is, a form of 
democracy un-beholden to Western models and suitable to Russian traditions of 
relations between the people and the Tsar-ruler. 
 
The introduction of a new President, Dmitryi A. Medvedev, hand-picked by Putin in 
2008, with Putin assuming the role of Prime Minister, has somewhat complicated 
this legitimating structure. This meant there were now  constitutionally two nominal 
‘sovereigns,’ with separate spheres of authority: Putin for domestic affairs and the 
economy, Medvedev for foreign policy and defence Not surprisingly, Putin’s views 
have tended to predominate, although there are obviously cases and issues where 
their different personalities and backgrounds have led to differences in emphasis and 
modes of expression of their common policies. 
 
Despite their frequent resort to Great Russian chauvinism to marshal support for 
their foreign and defence initiatives, the two sometimes evince a disarming sense of 
pragmatism in pursuit of their goals. Following Putin’s extremely aggressive, not to 
say arrogant, verbal assault on US hegemony and his announcement of Russia’s 
commitment to multilateralism, international law and the sanctity of UN Security 
Council approval for any resort to force at the annual East-West security conference 
in Munich in February 2007, Russia resumed intelligence-gathering air and 
submarine patrols along the Arctic sea routes around the UK and North America. 
This led to renewed confrontations with NATO air and naval forces reminiscent of the 
Cold War.9
 
  It appeared that the hard-liners in the military and security hierarchies, 
who had never ceased their opposition to Russia’s decline in foreign influence and 
military status, had won out on such issues. The new wealth generated by the world 
hydrocarbon boom made it seem self-evident that Russia could now afford to restore 
its military fortunes.  
                                                 
7 Sarah Whitmore, ‘Parliamentary Oversight in Putin’s Neo-patrimonial State. Watchdogs or 
Showdogs,? Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 62, No. 6, 2010, pp. 999-1025. 
8 To be sure, Putin went out of his way to deny his personal anti-Semitism by continuing to favour 
other Jewish oligarchs who played according to his rules and to show support to selected rabbis and to 
Jews who had been important to him during his childhood in St. Petersburg, such as his judo coach 
and school teachers. 
9 Peter Hennesy and Richard Knight, ‘Russia’s intelligence attacks: The Anna Chapman danger,’ BBC 
Radio 4, Why Russia Spies, BBC News, 17 August 2010. 
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However, at almost the same time, Putin began a thorough reform of the Russian 
military by appointing a civilian tax expert—also with a St. Petersburg law school 
connection—as the new Minister of Defence, charged with transforming the Russian 
Army along modern lines. Anatolyi Serdyukov’s brief was to down-size, restructure 
and re-equip the Russian army, navy and air force, basically along US lines. The 
vigorous resistance of the military hierarchy has delayed the fulfilment of these plans, 
but such resistance has been resolutely confronted. 
 
The five-day war against Georgia in August 2008 demonstrated the overwhelming 
power but also the underlying weaknesses of the Russian Army in terms of modern 
weaponry and tactics. It also led to the resumption of serious political tensions with 
the West, causing Medvedev, barely settled into the Presidency, to issue a strident 
new statement of Russian foreign policy principles, in effect elaborating on Putin’s 
Munich declaration: namely, 1) on the supremacy of international law; 2) the 
centrality of multi-polarity as a goal of Russian policy; 3) the basically non-
confrontational character of Russian foreign policy; 4) protection of Russian citizens 
wherever they reside; and 5) the development of especially close relations with 
‘friendly regions.’ Medvedev would in time resile from the more aggressive 
undertones of this statement as the Western furore over the Georgian intervention 
settled down and other issues of Russian domestic and foreign policy came to the 
fore. 
 
Returning to the primary goals and sub-goals of Russian foreign (and domestic) 
policy, one can see that the main goal is to restore Russia’s status as a major world 
power, with a number of sub-goals, involving various strategies and tactics to achieve 
it. Among these sub-goals, not necessarily in order of importance, the following stand 
out: 
1) To reform and modernize the Russian military to make it a more effective and 
efficient instrument of hard power; 
2) To modernize and technologically re-equip Russian science, technology and 
industry to make them competitive on a world scale; 
3) To re-shape the international security ‘architecture’ to enhance Russia’s ability to 
promote certain policies and interests and to block others deemed hostile to Russian 
interests; 
4) To forestall Western interference in the zone of Russia’s so-called ‘privileged 
interests’—mainly in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)—and to prevent 
‘coloured revolutions,’ which unseated regimes previously friendly to Russia and its 
perceived interests; 
5) To split the solidarity of the West by the use of resource diplomacy and other 
instruments of hard and soft power, thus gaining leverage over the political and 
economic decisions of certain targeted countries; 
6) To undermine the previously undisputed power of the USA and its NATO 
machinery to set the content and directions of Western international, military, 
security, and economic policies; 
7) To use the prospect of closer military and economic relations with China and India 
to enhance Russia’s ability to influence Western policies. 
 
All of these sub-goals are subordinated to the main goal of maximizing Russia’s status 
as a world power. They are linked together, more or less effectively by a legitimising 
goal with its associated rationality. The ideology behind them is not necessarily 
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distinctly or expressly formulated, but most participants in the policy debates 
recognize the need for its existence as an orientation and legitimation factor.10
 
  
One candidate for such an ideology was the so-called ‘Neo-Eurasian’ 
Weltanschauung associated with the name of Aleksandr Dugin, a Professor of history 
at Moscow State University and the Director of its new Center for Conservative 
Studies. Neo-Eurasianism proclaims the non-Western essence of Russian culture and 
civilization and places Russia at the head of a movement of Aryan peoples inhabiting 
the space between West and East, with ethnic Russians in the role of elder brothers. 
Unlike its late 19th and early 20th Century forbears, Neo-Eurasianism contains an 
overtly anti-Semitic focus, perceiving the Jews as the leaders of the ‘dark-skinned 
southern’ peoples diabolically ill-disposed to Russian greatness. Its geopolitical 
origins reflect the ‘heartland’ concepts of Halford Mackinder and Karl Haushofer, 
under which whoever controls the Eurasian heartland, controls the world. For Dugin 
and his followers, Russia’s rulers must constantly strive to defend and preserve its 
control of Eurasia and its mystical mission to save the world against the West and the 
Jews who insidiously guide its actions.11
 
  Dugin recognizes the fascination of Russia 
and Russians for Western technology and culture, but he warns against being 
seduced by them as a threat to the spiritual strength and purity of Russia and its 
Eurasian followers.  
This chiliastic preaching of Eurasianist mysticism is precisely why the current 
leadership, while recognizing the usefulness of its nationalist appeal among 
significant sections of the elite and the hoi polloi, has rejected its constraints on their 
policy, particularly when dealing with potentially friendly foreign governments. They 
have instead settled for a less mystical and opportunistic form of nationalism, as 
espoused, for example, by right-wing nationalists of the ilk of Vladimir Zhirinovskii 
and the Nashi (Ours)youth group organized by the ‘Grey Cardinal.’ Vladislav Surkov, 
the inventor of ‘sovereign democracy.’ but definitely not by the left-wing nationalism 
promoted by Eduard Limonov’s National Bolsheviks.12
 
 
The approved kind of nationalism has considerable resonance among important 
segments of the Russian power elite, particularly in the armed forces and the security 
services, as well as in the defence industry. However, it, too, can sometimes act as a 
constraint on the freedom of Putin and Medvedev to pursue whatever they consider 
necessary to achieve their overall goal of national power. This is well illustrated by the 
conservative resistance to their desire to purchase foreign military technology to 
accelerate the modernization of the Russian armed forces. The recent decision, 
announced by Defence Minister Serdyukov, to spend up to 10bn euros on the 
acquisition of West European military equipment over the 2010-2016 period, 
                                                 
10 See, for example, Viktor L. Larin, Aziatsko-Tikhookeanskii region v nachale XXI veka: vyzovy, 
ugrozy, shansy Tikhookeanskoi Rossii, Vladivostok, Dsal’nauka, 2010, especially pp. 49-50. I am 
indebted to Kyle Wilson for calling this important publication to my attention. Larin  is the director of 
the Institute of History, Archaeology and Ethnography of the Far Eastern Division of the Russian 
Academy of Sciences. 
11 For a good analysis of the content of Dugin’s doctrine and its pernicious effects see Dorothy 
Horsfield, ‘Mind the Gap: The Significance of Neo-Eurasianism Under the Putin/Medvedev 
Government,’ unpublished MA thesis, London School of Econonmics, 2009, which, despite the title, 
does not consider Eurasianism as the dominant ideology of the Putin/Medvedev tandem.  
12 Limonov, a prominent writer had been a co-founder of Neo-Eurasianism, but he had quit the 
movement in disagreement with its anti-socialist and anti-technological biases. Limonov has 
occasionally joined with other anti-regime parties and movements to demonstrate against the 
Putin/Medvedev leadership. 
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although radically ambitious, demonstrates a recognition that Russian industry is not 
capable of carrying out this task on its own. In addition to the acquisition of four 
French Mistral amphibious assault ships (the first one or two to be built in France 
and the rest under licence in Russia), they intend to acquire French thermal imaging 
and fire control electronics, Israeli unmanned aerial vehicles, and Italian light multi-
role vehicles.13
 
  Some of these purchases will be directly imported, but most will 
involve development of Russian capacity to produce the equipment under licence, 
thus helping to modernise Russian industry ‘on the quick.’ 
To modernise the civilian economy, Medvedev has sought to replicate California’s 
Silicon Valley in Skolkovo on the outskirts of Moscow to encourage the introduction 
of foreign capital and expertise for the development of an internationally competitive 
Russian hi-tech capability. This will be no easy task because of the country’s 
unenviable reputation for corrupt and arbitrary treatment of foreign investments, as 
well as Putin’s express intention to maintain majority state ownership of strategic 
sectors Medvedev’s evident fascination with the latest IT innovations is being used to 
legitimise foreign involvement for the benefit of Russian national interests. 
 
There is nothing unusual or alarming in such initiatives, and indeed they are to be 
welcomed, provided, of course, that the interests involved are not one-sided and the 
benefits accrue to more than a small segment of Western business. As in the case of 
Western economic involvement with China, the role and intentions of the state in 
nominally commercial ventures deserve to be kept under close scrutiny by the 
Western governments affected. This is not always easy in the case of huge multi-
national companies under conditions of globalisation. 
 
The classic example of Putin’s use of economic, in this case, resource, diplomacy for 
obvious political objectives is the attempt to lure Western businesses and, by 
extension, governments to join as minority partners in the exploration, extraction 
and transportation of oil and gas.14
 
  He succeeded in recruiting former German 
Chancellor Gerhardt Schroeder to sign up to the construction of the so-called Nord 
Stream gas pipeline under Gazprom control, thus undermining the EU policy of 
seeking multiplicity of oil and gas suppliers and directly harming the interests of 
fellow EU members Poland and Lithuania. In the South, via South Stream, Russia has 
attempted to do the same thing by undercutting the US- and EU- favoured Nabucco 
pipeline and trying to sign up a number of Balkan and SE European countries with 
promises of transit payments and the establishment of gas storage hubs. In the 
process, she has also lured Turkey, a partner in the Nabucco project, to join South 
Stream, so far with some partial success.  
The GFC and the attendant reduction in demand for gas, as well as the development 
of LNG and other alternative sources have seriously undermined this resource 
                                                 
13 ‘Russia to Buy 10 Billion Euros in Foreign Arms By 2016,’ Defence Talk, Global Defence & Military 
Portal,’ RIA Novosti, <http://www.defencetalk.com/russia-to-buy-10-billion-euros-in-foreign-arms-
by-2016-27224>, accessed 24 June 2010. 
14 Previous attempts to use spurious environmental concerns to assert state control over BP and Shell 
partnerships showed the ‘flexible’ nature of  Putin’s attitude toward security of contracts. More 
recently, he and Medvedev have shown more genuine flexibility in dealings with major resource 
multinationals. A good example is the latest deal with BP involving a 50-50 partnership with Rosneft 
to explore and extract hydrocarbons from deep sea deposits under the Russian part of the Arctic Sea. 
See, for example, Brian Swint, ‘Rosneft Deal Shows Russia Is More Open to Investment, IEA Says.’ 
Bloomberg 10 February 2011, cited in JRL 2011-#24, 10 February 2011, 
<www.worldsecurityinstitute.com>, accessed 10 February 2011.  
Miller, ANZJES 2(2)/3(1) 
21 
diplomacy strategy, but there are no signs of its being abandoned. Indeed, Russia has 
tried to expand the reach of the strategy by making deals for the exploitation of 
hydrocarbons in Latin America and other Third World regions that welcome the 
opportunity to undercut the operations of the American-controlled multi-nationals 
which had traditionally dominated their economies. 
 
Concerning relations with the USA, President Obama’s offer of a ‘reset’ of Russo-
American relations was greeted with cautious optimism by Moscow. The need for a 
re-negotiation of the START treaty on nuclear weapons was paramount, since the 
existing treaty was about to expire, and both sides wished to inject some element of 
certainty and transparency in that aspect of their relationship. The atmospherics of 
the relationship did improve, although hard-liners on both sides were unhappy about 
the alleged concessions involved and expressed fears that the concessions on their 
side would be seen by the other as a sign of weakness. The ratification of Start III 
promised a new start to the relationship. 
 
There is little doubt that, superficially at least, the new ‘détente’ did provide some 
benefits from the American perspective: namely, on the question of Russian support 
for tightened UN sanctions against Iran and North Korea over their covert 
development of nuclear weapons. Concerning Libya, Russia and China were prevailed 
upon not to veto the Western-sponsored resolution on a no-fly zone to protect the 
rebel forces in the UN Security Council, despite their reservations on the wording. 
 
On the Russian side, it led to Washington’s tacit abandonment of military and direct 
political support for the opposition to pro-Russian forces in Georgia, Ukraine and 
Moldova. In Serbia, too, Russia gained agreement to NATO’s tacit acceptance that 
Belgrade, although participating in the Partnership for Peace program and having 
sent a few troops to Afghanistan, would never become a member of NATO.15
 
 
The re-set also resulted in the abandonment of NATO plans to station ABM rockets 
and radars in Poland and the Czech Republic, although their replacement by a more 
dispersed, mobile system based on the Aegis platform and the stationing of an 
American-manned Patriot anti-aircraft missile detachment (to assuage Polish fears of 
abandonment by NATO) did not go down very well in Moscow. Nor did President 
Medvedev’s project to change the international security architecture and gain 
recognition of the Cooperative Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) as on a parallel 
with NATO by the UNSC and the EU, thus giving Moscow a veto over the use of force 
in Europe and elsewhere, gain much traction. 
 
Again, however, Medvedev displayed a good deal of flexibility. Although Moscow 
agreed to UN sanctions on Iran and North Korea, it relied on overt Chinese 
opposition in principle to such sanctions to water them down, and tacitly to violate 
their spirit by continuing to supply Iran with ‘defensive’ weapons. Arms sales were, to 
be sure, a lucrative supplier of funds to the Russian arms industry, but they also 
reflected a continuing commitment to the underlying goal of undermining US 
influence throughout the world. 
 
                                                 
15 The Russian Ambassador to the Bosnian Federation, A.B. Kharchenko, has stated that his country 
would defend the interest of Serbs in B-H against challenges by the Muslim-dominated and EU and 
NATO supported government. ‘Branimo opstanak Republike Srpske,’ Srpski glas, 6 November 2009, 
p.4. 
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Another example of Russian attempts to exert pressure and then backing down when 
the pressure met with strong resistance concerned the long-attempted effort to join 
the World Trade Organisation. Under Obama, the longstanding US Congressional 
opposition to Russian membership (the Jackson-Vanek amendment) was relaxed. 
Meanwhile, for domestic political and economic reasons, Putin ordered the 
establishment of a Customs Union with Belarus and Kazakhstan and pledged to seek 
WTO membership only as a collective applicant. When it was pointed out that such 
collective memberships were invalid under WTO rules, when Belarusan President 
Alyaksandr Lukashenka began to resist Moscow’s conditions for the customs union, 
and when Kazakhstan’s President Nazarbayev showed little enthusiasm for joint 
membership, Moscow backed down and announced that each member of the 
Customs Union would apply individually. 
 
Nor did Russian efforts to leverage their military and economic ‘strategic partnership’ 
with China and India seem to be working as intended. Militarily, the Chinese had 
begun to develop their own advanced weapons-production programs. Indeed, 
Rosoboroneksport, the state arms sales monopoly, soon found itself directly 
competing with cheaper Chinese versions of Russian weapons systems on third-
country markets, often with pirated Russian designs. India, meanwhile, had begun to 
cooperate closely with the USA in developing its own weapons systems. The arrest 
and pending extradition of Russian arms dealer Viktor Bout from Thailand to the US, 
over strong Russian Foreign Ministry protests, which suggest an SVR or GRU 
connection, illustrate the continued murkiness of Russian involvement in foreign 
military and political affairs16
 
 
A comprehensive catalogue of Medvedev’s (and Putin’s) foreign policies is set forth in 
a ‘Program for the Effective Use on a Systematic Basis of Foreign Policy Factors for 
the Goals of the Long-Term Development of the Russian Federation,’ commissioned 
by Medvedev and submitted for his approval by Foreign Minister Lavrov on 17 May 
2010.17  It is a 35-page wish list of projects for modernizing the Russian economy and 
fostering Russia’s inclusion in all major developments in international affairs in the 
context of the weakening of US and European power and influence caused by the 
GFC. Russia demands inclusion in all institutional and policy changes in the 
economic and security architecture and, where possible, the right of veto over 
decisions which might affect Russian interests, including changes in the international 
financial and trade systems. It also contains goals for Russian policies toward 
selected countries and multilateral structures, such as the EU, the G20, APEC, the 
SCO and, especially the UNSC and UNGA. Most revealingly, it seeks to circumscribe 
the ability of the UNSC and individual countries to impose sanctions on countries, 
which in Russia’s opinion do not constitute a threat to general world peace and 
security.18 In this connection, it targets US sanctions against Russian firms which 
allegedly quite legally supply arms to countries like Iran, and Syria that are 
considered rogue states in the West.19
                                                 
16 Especially in connection with the recent affair of the ten Russian ’sleepers’ exchanged for Russian 
informers for the USA held in Russian detention, sometimes called the ‘Anna Chapman Affair’. 
Hennessy and Knight, BBC, loc.cit. Further speculation on Bout’s high-level intelligence connections 
see Peter Yost and Stephen Braun, ‘U.S., Russia face off over alleged arms trafficker.’Post, 23 August 
2010, reproduced in Johnson’s Russia List, 2010-#159, item 23.<
 
www.cdi.org/russia/johnson.>, 
accessed 23 August 2010.   
17 Published in Russian by Russkii Newsweek on 17 May 2010., pp. 1-35. 
18 Ibid., p. 4. 
19 Ibid., p. 20. 
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By and large, few of Russia’s initiatives in foreign policy reflected in Lavrov’s 
ambitious project have borne much fruit. That is partly because the gap between 
policies and their implementation remains wide, which, in turn, reflects a certain 
ambivalence on the part of the bureaucrats involved about making the kinds of 
compromises with target countries that true diplomacy requires. In the words of 
Stephen Blank of the US Army War College, in reference to Russia’s failure to treat 
Japan with consideration, despite her strategic and economic importance in the Far 
East, ‘Evidently, the old Soviet idea that you can only be friends with someone you 





Early post-Soviet Russia was adrift in its foreign and domestic policy. Under the 
delusion that by eschewing the goals and processes of Soviet socialism, it would be 
accepted as a member of the Western club of advanced nation-states As part of the 
presumed bargain, Yel’tsin and his supporters fully accepted the Fukuyama construct 
of ‘the end of history’ and the triumph of the democratic-free-market capitalist 
model. In governance terms, that meant introducing formal-legal rationality and 
legitimate parliamentary democracy with a separation of powers. Unlike his Stalinist 
predecessors, however, he had not annihilated his opponents, and their increasingly 
strident opposition to his policies of cooperation with the West soon led to chaos and 
a direct clampdown on challenges to his policies. By the end of his reign, Yel’tsin 
himself had begun to question his pro-Western orientation. His selection of V.V.Putin 
as his successor reflected this turn-about. 
 
Gradually, as Putin restored order in the system and brought about changes in the 
way formal-legal institutions operated, it became increasingly clear that the operation 
of his so-called ‘dictatorship of laws’ was subordinate to his personal wishes and 
perspectives and to the whims of the juridical and functional bureaucracies involved 
in implementing his policies. Thus, although the levers of decision-making power 
were concentrated in Putin’s hands at the apex of the ‘vertical of power,’ there was a 
certain amount of bargaining among the various groupings of his supporters. In 
short, under this evolving ‘neo- patrimonial’ system, formal rationality, in Weberian 
terms, served as a mere fig leaf for substantive rationality. In any event, Putin did not 
realistically have to worry very much about public support for his policies. In a 
Weberian sense, the formal rationality basis of his (and Medvedev’s) authority rested 
on compliance with the wishes of his bureaucratic supporters, primarily among the 
siloviki.21  Opinion polls have shown declining interest among the populace at large 
in political matters, which they see as a ‘dirty business.’22
 
 
What was still lacking was some form of goal legitimation, that is, an ideology with 
which to bind the various institutional and personal components of the system to a 
common purpose. This is not necessarily a universal impulse, but it was especially 
                                                 
20 Stephen Blank, ‘Russia Insults Japan Even As It Seeks Peace and Friendship.’ Jamestown 
Foundation, Eurasia Daily Monitor, Vol. 7, Issue 154, August 10, 2010, pp. 3-4.  
21 This important point was suggested to me by an anonymous reviewer of  this essay, for which I 
express my thanks. 
22 Olga Zhermeleva, ‘Sociologists Say That the Russians Become Increasingly More Apolitical.’ RBC 
Daily 12 April 2011. In JRL No. 2011 # 65. 12 April 2011<www.worldsecurityinstitute.org>, accessed 12 
April 2011. 
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powerful within the inherited political culture of Soviet bolshevism. In the words of 
Valerii Senderov, 
 
 ‘…the fact, perhaps, is not so much in the [content] of the idea 
itself as in the permanent longing for it. In the aggressive longing for finality 
and clarity, primitiveness and simplicity—in the basic  
feeling of the nostalgic post-Soviet mentality.’ [my translation]23
 
 
The content of the anti-American nationalist ideology began to emerge under Putin, 
after a brief hiatus of closer ties with the USA following the 9/11 attack on the World 
Trade Center in New York in 2001. According to Andreas Umland and other authors 
cited by him in the Introduction to the symposium volume cited above, the 
nationalist, anti-American and anti-Western ideological campaign was not purposely 
focussed on popular sentiment until 2005 and became more or less official in 2007 in 
Putin’s Munich speech already mentioned. 
 
The goal of the emerging ideology, which in Rigby’s terms served to legitimise 
Russian foreign policy, was to advance Russian national interests, as interpreted by 
Putin and Medvedev, by thwarting US efforts at collective action to maintain its 
hegemony in international affairs. The five-day war against Georgia in August 2008 
intensified this hostility to the West. As long as Russia seemed to be relatively 
unaffected by the GFC, this goal played a significant role in rallying support for the 
policy of taking advantage of American weakness to push for changes in the world 
economic and security architecture.  
 
It was only after the full effect of the collapse of oil revenues and foreign investment 
in the Russian economy and the failure of efforts to leverage Russian control over 
resources and downstream capacities became apparent, that Putin and Medvedev 
began to change their tone. In particular, they sought to take advantage of the new 
‘re-set’ offered by US President Obama to improve relations and to try to attract 
Western technology and capital to accelerate the reform of the Russian military and 
improve the competitiveness of Russia’s scientific and technological establishments. 
However, this change of tone does not necessarily signify abandonment of the overall 
goal of reducing American power and influence in the management of major 
international issues.  
 
The entire system of legitimation rests on the strength of leadership of Putin and his 
alter ego Medvedev. Their carefully scripted image of strength, decisiveness and 
wisdom are the cement which has held together what is essentially a hierarchical neo-
Soviet authoritarian system. The Russian nationalist ideology which legitimises their 
actions and the modes for undertaking them is essentially a negative one. The evident 
shortcomings in their responses to the recent series of calamities and natural 
disasters have illustrated the rigidity and inefficiencies of their evolving governance 
model and may call into question the automatic support they have enjoyed in the 
past.24
                                                 
23 Boris Senderov,’Neoevraziistvo: real’nost.’ opasnost.’ perspektivy.’ in Andreas Umland (ed.) 
Antizapadnye ideologicheskie techeniia v postsovetskoi Rossii I ih istoki, Forum noveishei 
vostochnoevropeiskoi istorii I kul’tury – Russkoe izdanie, No. 1, 2009. p. 115. <
 Both leaders of the tandem seem to be ambivalent, not to say concerned, over 
http://www.1.ku 
eichstaett.de./ZIMOS/forum/inhaltruss11.html.>. 
24 Most notably the suicide bombings in the Moscow Metro and Domodedovo airport and the bushfires 
and later winter freeze showed Medvedev, in particular, to be weak on action. Not even Putin’s 
customary ‘Action Man’ blather seemed to have the customary effect on the population. 
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the democratic turmoil in the Middle East. Medvedev, at least rhetorically, appears to 
be more accommodating of the changes, but the differences between them are 
probably being overdrawn by both domestic and foreign observers. At the time of 
writing, no-one seems to be able to predict which of them will  choose to run for 
President in the 2012 elections. They may not yet have decided themselves.  
 
The new ideology is thus not really comparable to the universalistic, positively 
oriented ideology of Marxism-Leninism which preceded it. Nor can the new model of 
moderate authoritarian control over politics and the media be compared with the 
monopolisation of truths achieved under Stalin and opportunistically extended under 
Khrushchev and Brezhnev. Rigby’s conception of goal rationality is thus not strictly 
applicable to this new power configuration, but it does provide some useful criteria 
for distinguishing the post-Soviet system from its predecessors and highlighting the 
search for some sort of orientational ideology. 
                                      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
